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The Equality of the Gaze: The Animal
Stares Back in Chris Marker’s Films
Kierran Argent Horner, King’s College London
(kierran.horner@kcl.ac.uk)
Abstract:
This article considers a selection of Chris Marker’s films in the context of noted
differences between Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jacques Derrida’s positions on the
animal as Other, the potential for the animal face. Derrida (2008) himself argues
that Levinas ‘did not make the animal anything like a focus of interrogation within
his work ’ (p. 105). Statements such as this about Levinas’s ethics seem to make
his position clear. In contrast, Derrida’s thinking on the matter of the animal, and
in particular human responsibility for them as Other, stands as a thorough and
influential body of ethical thought, probing the limited and limiting boundary
between human and animal. His autobiographical texts, according to Lynn Turner
(2015, p. 135), welcome animal others. Marker’s images, I will argue, address
an equity between species through what he refers to as the e´galite´ du regard,
an equality in the gaze (of the camera). These images speak to a space beyond
themselves and it is within this territory, I will argue, that the animal does have
a face, that can occur via that of the human.
Keywords: Marker; Levinas; Derrida; Animal; Gaze; Ethics
In his seminal text on the question of the animal Other in Levinas’s
thought, the philosopher John Llewelyn (1991) observes:
When asked about our responsibilities toward nonhuman sentient
creatures, he is inclined to reply that our thinking about them may have
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to be only analogical or that the answer turns on whether in the eyes
of the animal we can discern a recognition, however obscure, of his own
mortality – on whether, in Levinas’s sense of the word, the animal has a face.
(pp. 56–57)
The idea of the animal face as an analogy will be returned to later in this
article, but first I wish to concentrate on the fundamental ambiguity
demonstrated by Levinas’s texts when confronted with key questions
around responsibility for the animal, Otherness and the animal face. Diane
Perpich (2008) argues that ‘ for Levinas what matters is not a what but a
who ’ (p. 154). Perpich’s decisive indication of Levinas’s consideration
of the human - the who - as what matters aligns with Derrida’s perception
of his work above. But accepting Perpich’s summation, which refers to a
distinct division between animal and human, obscures a level of ambiguity
on both sides of that divide in Levinas’s work. Such uncertainty is present
in the essential component of his ethical philosophy of the ‘ face ’, a term
queried throughout his career. The face-to-face obligates the subject
to the Other and ‘places the center of gravitation of a being outside
of that being ’ (Levinas, 2012b, p 183). Slavoj Zˇizˇek’s summation of
the effect of the face in Levinas’s ethics is perhaps the most precise:
‘When face to face with the other, I am infinitely responsible to him.
This is the original ethical constellation’ (2005, p. 148). The face-to-face
encounter encapsulates, in essence, the responsibility of the subject for
the Other. It is in this meeting between faces that the ethical obligation,
the asymmetrical relation between subject and Other, occurs. In his later
thought Levinas contends that the face is not the fac¸ade presented to the
world, not the features, the eyes and nose, but alterity itself (Wright,
Hughes & Ainley, 1988, p. 170). So, does the animal have a face? Is
it an Other who obligates the subject to be responsible? Can the animal
be a subject? These are questions posed and to some degrees answered
by Derrida elsewhere in intimate exploration of Levinas’s writings
with vacillating conclusion (Derrida, 1991, p. 96–119). Cary Wolfe
(2003) detects a negative in response to the questions posed above on
the animal’s ethical call to the human in Levinasian ethics, concluding
that for Levinas, the animal ‘has no face; it cannot be an other ’ (pp. 61
and 65). In contrast, Matthew Calarco (2008) argues against an
anthropocentrism in Levinas’s philosophy, despite the philosopher’s
own stance, suggesting that non-human animals, as others, can elicit a
sense of responsibility in human beings (p. 55). It is in the gaps between
such polarized readings as these and those between the thoughts of
Levinas and Derrida in regard to questions of the animal Other that the
terrain of this article is plotted.
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The Animal as Other
Derrida considers that Levinas attempts to locate the ‘animal outside of
the ethical circuit ’ (2008, p. 106). Whereas Derrida’s own ethical thought
would place the animal back within this circuit, I would question the
drawing of a crude boundary that, in Levinas, does not only not consider
the animal as a ‘ them’ in contrast to ‘us ’, but does not consider them at all
(2008, p. 106). Derrida endeavors to position the animal in a sequence
with the human Other, rather than on the other side of a partition, asking
whether it isn’t ‘more other still, more radically other […] than the other
in who I recognize my brother, than the other in whom I identify
my fellow or my neighbour? ’ (2008, p. 107). The animal should
be considered as more Other than the neighbor, which, in Levinas’s
Otherwise Than Being, is roughly synonymous with the Other as it is
theorized in Totality and Infinity. It would be more vulnerable than
the human Other and one, therefore, would be obliged to them, be more
responsible for them:
If I have a duty – something owed before any debt, before any right – toward
the other, wouldn’t it then also be toward the animal, which is still more
other than the other human, my brother or my neighbour? (Derrida, 2008,
p. 107)
Derrida concludes that Levinas does not accept this premise and refuses to
take account of the animal as Other. Derrida’s position is not intended
to corrode the boundaries between human and non-human, to ignore
the differences between species; instead he argues that ‘you have to
multiply the differences ’, not blur them (1987, p. 183). His ethics accounts
for a lineage, perhaps a Darwinian-evolutionary approach to genera, in
which the human is just one species alongside the cat, the horse, the
snake. Derrida’s is ‘perhaps the most sustained effort to link difference-
based philosophy to animal issues ’, according to Calarco (2015, p. 34).
Derrida’s argument for a focus on and proliferation of difference
confounds Levinas’s disregard for the animal as Other, the impossibility
of the animal face.
The Camera Gaze: The Animal in Marker’s Cinematic Images
Marker has what cinema critic Bamchade Pourvali calls a ‘profound
attachment to animals ’ (2003, p. 66). Many of his films are dominated by
images of them and comment on the violence humans enact upon them
(Three Cheers for the Whale [1972] and Bullfight in Okinawa [1994]), or
the network we intrinsically share with them (Letter to Siberia [Lettre de
Siberie, 1958] and Theories des Ensembles [1990]). Not only do Marker’s
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films offer a menagerie of animal images, but they present these images
as both what they are – shots of animals – and as complex metaphors.
Jonathan Burt has written of the ‘semantic overload ’ of the animal
image in film, how it is a site where metaphorical associations ‘collapse
into each other ’, where it becomes ‘a form of rupture in the field
of representation ’ (2002, p. 11). The animal image is a location for a
confluence of metaphors, its signification cracked and multiplied. This
rupture can lead to a weakening of the animal image in film in which
it stands only for something else. Llewellyn’s notion of the necessarily
‘analogical ’ relationship the human has with the animal singular in
Levinas’s thought, is pertinent here. Our thinking about the animal is
analogous, at one remove from our thinking about the human.
For Marker, however, the image of the animal is always the animal
it represents, but it can also refer to other animals (humans) and complex
concepts. Levinas and Marker seem to be approaching the same problem
from opposite sides. Laura McMahon writes in her introduction to
the recent Screen ‘Animals Dossier ’, that the ‘presence of the animal
onscreen often confounds clear distinctions between the diegetic and the
extradiegetic ’ (2015, p. 82). The animal image communicates with
other images and ideas not only within the confines of the frame but
beyond it, and this is evident as a discernible communication between
the animal and human in Marker’s work. At times anthropomorphism,
at others the opposite, Marker regularly presents himself as an animal,
famously through his avatar Guillaume-en-E´gypte, the ‘guide ’ through his
CD-Rom Immemory (1997), his arbiter in the online game Second Life, his
representative in Agne`s Varda’s Beaches of Agne`s (Les Plages d’Agne`s, 2008)
and a real cat. Marker has also identified himself with the elephant child of
Rudyard Kipling’s Just-So Stories (1902), because of his ‘ insatiable
curiosity ’ (Douhaire & Rivoire, 2003, p. 39).
Marker’s images do not however commit the same violence that,
for Anat Pick, cinema commits on the animal as one of the ‘modern
biopolitical apparatuses that not only control and process nonhuman
bodies but constitute animals as bodies, and lives, to-be-dominated ’
(2015, p. 98). Instead, Marker’s articulations demonstrate a particular
equity between the human and animal in his films. Similarly, Nora
Alter notes that: ‘Marker’s camera treats all subjects in front of its lens
without differentiating between humans, statues, animals, landscapes,
architecture or signs ’ (2006, p. 59). Marker’s camera is indiscriminate,
filming humans and animals (and inanimate objects) as equals. Such
de-humanising, being less human and more like (certain) animals, is not
regressive for Marker, instead he considers an association with animals
as positive.
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There is in Marker’s images what he himself refers to in the commentary
of Sans soleil (1983) as the e´galite´ du regard, reiterated in his eponymous
article on the film (1993, p. 85). In Marker’s films the camera-lens is
a position through which a unity occurs, through which a reciprocal
or reciprocated gaze passes. This equality between gazes is, as Marker
writes elsewhere, a rapport between subjects (2008, p. 144). Catherine
Gillet argues that it is in ‘ the equality of the look’ that the ‘poignance of
things is measured’ (2006, p. 79) and this occurs through and because of
the pauses, the frozen frames in Marker’s Sans Soleil. Gillet’s argument
suggests the image as captured, postponed as a living being and adorned
and adored as a prize. The poignancy of a moment is only visible if that
moment is seized and if the gaze of the camera is met. The moments
of the gaze meet as a reciprocated look and are not concerned with the
tenderness felt by the cameraman for his subjects, but reflect the equality
between them. Such an analysis would position Marker’s consideration
of the animal against Derrida’s focus on and multiplication of differences
between species. Indeed, Marker breaks down the boundaries between
animal and human in his films.
For Marker, animals represent what the voiceover in Sans Soleil refers
to as a ‘partition wall that separates life from death’. This movement
between life and death contains what Catherine Lupton calls his
‘preoccupation with cultures that find a way to accommodate death’
(2008, pp. 158–159). Death is integral to Marker’s consideration
of the cultures he encounters, and the ways in which societies interpret
it is a key to unlocking differences and, more importantly, understanding
similarities between them. To use Levinas’s descriptions, death is
an ‘ irreducible oncoming movement ’, the ‘concrete and primary
phenomenon’ for every being (2012b, p. 233 and p. 235). In this
sense, at least, there is equality between human and animal in Levinas’s
thought. Death is the event that all living beings encounter and which
therefore connects them all, although for Edgar Morin, ‘ the human species
is the only one for whom death is present in life ’ (1970, p. 17). The human
is the only species that thinks about death, for whom death is a constant
presence in their lives, differentiating it from other animals. Extending
Lupton’s analysis, the differences between ‘species ’ as well as cultures
can be considered through Marker’s communications with death in
his films. Burlin Barr writes that in Sans Soleil death ‘becomes a site
or a mise-en-scene for staging cultural contact ’ (2004, p. 181). Death is
the scene of Marker’s contact with the Other. And, for Marker, the animal,
if only analogically, is an Other for whom one is responsible. In Marker’s
films, images of animals remark on a transition between human and
animal and also life and death. Occurring mid-way through Sans Soleil,
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Japanese schoolchildren mourn the death of a Panda at a ceremony in
Tokyo zoo, and the narrator suggests that:
the partition wall that separates life from death does not seem so thick to
them as it does to a Westerner. What I read most often in the eyes of people
who are about to die, is surprise. What I read right now in the eyes of these
Japanese children is curiosity. As if they were trying, in order to understand
the death of an animal, to stare through the partition.
As these words are spoken, the images move from those of Japanese
children placing flowers on a tomb to a giraffe running through an African
savannah then back to the children. There is a motion from children
(humans) to animals, here. In the sequence, there is then a brief insert of a
close-up image of a man in a balaclava firing a pistol, which cuts back to
the giraffe ambling through the dusty plains. Abruptly the giraffe is shot
and falls down, rises and runs, is shot again, stumbles. Links are made
between death and life, Asia and Africa and, of course, the human and
the animal. This brief sequence reveals the animal as simultaneously
a signifier of death and the victim of man’s desire to capture and possess
the Other.
The animal image as metaphor for each of these ideas reverberates
throughout Marker’s cinematic works, for instance in his and Alain
Resnais’s Statues Also Die (Statues Meurent aussi, 1953). In a sequence
of two shots edited together rapidly, a gorilla, its stomach slashed, pitches
backwards from a sitting position, and the film then cuts to a shot of
the same beast lying on the dusty ground, mouth agape, eyes closed, in
a cliche´ of death. Filming the ape falling into supine stasis suggests
the passage from life to death. Further, in Marker’s commentary for
Joris Ivens’s …a` Valparaı´so (1965) he discusses a horse at Vin˜a del Mar
which had previously won a big race, yet after five years has to ‘play
the city’s game’. The commentary elaborates that Buffalo Bill ‘ is waiting for
his meat. A black cross is the sign of death, and his eyelids flutter – he
knows’. The horse bears the mark of death, and is conscious of it. In both
scenes, the animal, the gorilla, the horse, has death thrust prematurely,
unnaturally, upon them by humans. There is, in contradiction to Morin’s
assertion that death stalks human life only, a hint of anthropomorphism
in the horse’s consciousness of the death that haunts his life. In an
article exploring Andre´ Bazin’s film writing and the ‘exploration film’,
Seung-Hoon Jeong and Dudley Andrew (2008) propose that:
Lacking subjectivity, animals do not die as humans do; they simply expire
and perdure through their species. Cinema, however, has given us an
idea of ‘death itself ’ far starker than the humanized notion that occupies
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philosophy. Animal life is depicted by the camera as unconscious and
uncomprehending, and thus close to death. (p. 3)
Whilst the animal does not experience death as humans do, this ignorance
of death in animal being, as embodied by the cinema, is at once closer to
a living death. I argue that the final scene of Marker’s documentary,
The Base of the Air is Red (Le Fond de l’air est rouge, 1977) intimates that
animal life, and therefore death, is equivalent to that of human sacrifice.
There, also, the violence that humans commit upon animals is reflected
back onto humanity, posing ethical questions about the responsibility
for the Other.
In The Base of the Air is Red, a number of wolves are culled in order to
control the population and ‘for sport ’. The camera acts as or stands for a
weapon. The wolves disperse, scattering in fear, and a helicopter flies into
the frame, hovering above the ground. There is a cut to a shot filmed from
a helicopter in which a lone wolf, bounding, tongue lolling with exertion,
looks into the camera as bullets strike the dirt around it. The wolf is
offered the e´galite´ du regard, looking back and meeting the gaze of the
camera. The film then cuts to another image shot from the ground, the
camera pointing towards the helicopter, as if it were the target’s point
of view, as a man leans from an open door, a rifle at his shoulder. The
use of shot-reverse shot is deigned to engender sympathy in the viewer
as they too look up at death hovering above.
The narrator speaks of the political left being decimated in the decade
between 1968 and 1978 and the few of them left. Human and animal
are analogous. This scene is an echo of the opening scene of the film in
which an American military helicopter flies over villages allegedly hiding
Viet Cong guerrillas. The camera films from the cockpit of the aircraft,
as a pilot repeatedly describes their dropping of Napalm and the visible
dispersion of the villagers as ‘outstanding’, while high-octane explosions
decimate the jungle and fields below. Both humans and animals are
eradicated in the indiscriminate bombing, but they are not seen and
certainly not offered the e´galite´ du regard that the wolf in the later scene
is extended. In both sequences, death expunges vulnerable, defenceless
targets on the ground, and the camera is in an omnipresent, privileged
position, juxtaposed with the source of this death. The wolves and the
suspected Viet Cong fighters are associated, animal and human. The
connection between animal and human that Marker forms in order to query
the responsibility for the animal is furthered in Sans Soleil in footage of
convulsive cats in Minamata, Japan. These cats, poisoned by mercury
dumped in the town’s water supply by the Chisso Corporation chemical
factory, dribble, stumble and thrash about in paroxysmal pain, and an edit
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juxtaposes them with footage of human victims of the mercury pollution.
The human casualties also drool and writhe in agony. The cats are not just
fleeting metaphors for the people of the town as Marker reveals the equal
effect of the toxic water, the inevitability of death, for both species.
Marker’s images work to diminish the difference between species
that Derrida believes is essential, and also obligate the human spectator
to the animal Other and specifically their death in ways which Levinas
considered irrelevant. For Llewelyn, Levinas’s consideration of the
mortality of the animal is intrinsically linked to whether it has a face.
This question, put to Levinas by Llewelyn, received the response, that the
‘human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover
the face of the animal ’ (1991, p. 64–65). Derrida analyses this answer
as allowing for the potential of the animal face, and, therefore, the animal
gaze (2008, p. 109). The human relationship with the animal as Other
is, for Derrida one of the shared gaze, and Jennifer Fay writes that he
‘posits “the animal” problem as a visual phenomenon’ (2008, p. 55).
Famously, Derrida talks of the gaze of his cat catching him naked in his
bathroom, the face to face exchange between the animal and its master:
if the cat observes me frontally naked, face to face, and if I am naked faced
with the cat’s eyes looking at me as it were from head to toe, just to see, not
hesitating to concentrate its vision – in order to see, with a view to seeing.
(2008, p. 4)
In the instant of (the feeling of embarrassment at) being seen naked, the
face-to-face encounter between cat and human is discernible. The cat
looks back, meets the human gaze. It is pertinent that Derrida should
choose the cat for his example (although one could argue that he would
not expect to find many other species of animal in his bathroom). For
Marker, who calls himself ‘The Cat Who Walks by Himself ’, we do not
own cats, they own us, they ‘are gods, the most widespread and accessible
form of god’ (1952, p. 78). To him, cats are superior to humans, a deity
for, or at least amongst, them. This notion maintains the difference
between species and between the subject and the Other. The hierarchy
between subject and Other, with the latter positioned above the former, is
for Levinas vital to the responsibility for the Other, the Other’s face. As he
says in an interview later in his career:
It is the frailty of the one who needs you, who is counting on you. This is
where the idea of dissymmetry – which is very important to me – comes
from. It is not at all a question of a subject faced with an object. It is, on the
contrary, that I am strong and you are weak. I am your servant and you are
the master. (Wright et al, 1988, p. 171)
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It is essential that the Other be considered as vulnerable, in need of the
attention of the subject. Tina Chanter writes that Levinas’s philosophy
‘begins with the other ’ (1994, p. 223). But this relationship is in itself
vulnerable to flux. The subject is strong and subservient, the Other weak
and masterful. The mastery derives from the weakness. To transcend
phenomenal or inward existence, ‘does not consist in receiving the
recognition of the Other, but in offering him one’s being’ (Levinas,
2012b, p. 183). This hierarchy is one that remains exactly that, with
one individual in the ascendency which does not correspond with the
reciprocity at the core of the e´galite´ du regard of Marker’s camera. The
animal is certainly not worthy of being called an Other and Levinas
does not even know if the animal has a face to gaze back with. Without a
face, Levinas confirms, an animal cannot engage in the face-to-face
encounter from which responsibility for the Other issues. Whereas,
the cat for Marker is in the ascendency, as divinity, but can also be
vulnerable, both strong and weak, the master and the servant, and can
also obligate the (human) subject in and through Marker’s images. This
then, exactly as Derrida requires, multiplies the differences between the
species. The cat is Other to our subject and potentially subject to our
Other.
This variability in the position of the cat is evident in Marker’s photo-
film, Si j’avais quatre dromadaires (1966). In this short film, a sequence of
static photographs of animals passes in quick succession: a lioness, on her
back, staring into camera, caged by the stasis of the image and the bars
that surround her; a chained Alsatian dog and a cat, also staring into the
lens, clamped uncomfortably in the arms of a young girl, twice held. The
images all talk to the potential power humans have over these animals
and, therefore, the responsibility we have for them that, for the cats at
least, is projected through their gaze into the camera. This transitioning
between forms, animal and human is also, importantly, caught in the gaze
of the animal.
In Sans Soleil, one of the sequences in the markets of Bissau ends with
a cat looking at camera. The images preceding the shot of the cat are
of women customers of the market, whose gaze back at the camera Marker
films as the narrator explains, ‘ I could stare at [the women] again with
equality ’. The feline look that ends the sequence in the market of Bissau
also speaks to an awareness of the subject’s self, one’s singular existence
defined, not by the Other, but as an individual. According to John Berger,
the animal gaze that meets the human look draws attention to the human:
The same animal may well look at other species in the same way. He does
not reserve a special look for man. But by no other species except for man
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will the animal’s look be recognised as familiar. Other animals are held by
the look. Man becomes aware of himself returning the look. (2009, pp. 4–5)
Only humans recognise the look as a look, only they engage with the
gaze. Berger (2009) continues that the companionship between human
and animal is a ‘companionship offered to the loneliness of man’ (p. 6).
The cat’s gaze, as much as that of the women of the market, singles out the
man with the camera, makes him aware of his solitude, his individuality,
his difference. This is closer to Derrida (2008) and his embarrassment at
the cat looking at his nakedness, ‘ the gaze of the cat that sees me naked,
and sees me see it seeing me naked’ (p. 58), than to Levinas’s conception
of the animal’s gaze. In Marker’s film the cat makes the human aware of
his subject-hood.
But Levinas also writes of an animal that interacts with humans and
which not only emphasises their humanity, but returns it to them. In his
much-analysed essay ‘The Name of a Dog’, he refers to Bobby, the stray
dog that waits for ‘ the band of apes ’ to return home ‘barking in delight ’
and recognising their humanity (Levinas, 2012a, p 48 and p. 49). The
‘band of apes ’ includes Levinas himself along with other Jewish prisoners
of war in a Nazi concentration camp. Levinas, if only momentarily,
attributes a power to Bobby, the dog, that he typically reserves for the
Other, in (human) face-to-face encounters. In this brief paper, he also
finds a movement between the human and non-human, a contiguity
that specifically resides in the equity of death, that of the animal and of
the human (the European Jews at the hands of the Nazis). David L. Clark,
writing on Levinas’s essay, refers to the philosopher’s way of ‘narrowing the
distance between [animal and human] without actually saying that they are
the same thing’ (2004, p. 46). Levinas hesitates before assigning equality
between species, although, he writes that there is a ‘ transcendence in the
animal ’ (2012a, p. 48). The animal, the dog, Bobby, ascends in the same
manner as the Other does in the face-to-face encounter that forms the
core of Levinas’s ethical philosophy. In Marker’s short film, Cat Listening
to Music (1990) – made for Zapping Zone (Proposals for an Imaginary
Television) (1990–94), a mixed media installation – the animal transcends
its diminished position as pet and becomes at once a signifier for another
species and iconic image. The real Guillaume-en-E´gypte is filmed sleeping
on the keys of a keyboard, still, until suddenly waking and looking first
into camera and then just past it, at, one assumes, Marker himself filming.
The shot is reminiscent of the only moving images of Marker’s La Jete´e
(1962) in which the woman slowly wakes, her eyes open sleepily and she
stares at the camera, meeting its gaze. The similarity of the mise-en-sce`ne in
these sequences speaks to a link between the animal and human and the
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notion of the animal staring back, demanding responsibility is taken for
it as an Other, as it meets the lens, or eye, of the camera.
The Camera Eye: Face-to-Face (or Eye to Eye)
Marker frequently associates his camera with an eye, as when in Sans soleil,
the narrator says the ‘magical function of the eye is at the centre of all
things ’, over footage of local elections in Tokyo. Marker pointedly
associates the eye and the camera as the camera-eye. The concept of the
camera as eye derives primarily from Soviet director Dziga Vertov’s theory
of the Kino-Glaz (cine-eye). Writing in 1919, Vertov asserts that the cine-
eye is ‘more perfect than the human eye for examining the chaos of visual
phenomena’ and that it ‘perceives and fixes its impressions in a completely
different way from that of the human eye’ (2005, p. 91). The ways in which
the camera-eye perceives differ from those of the human eye. Jean Epstein
cultivates a similar idea in his contemporaneous writing about cinema.
For him the camera eye, like the human eye, ‘has its own perspective ’
(Epstein, 1988, p. 244). These notions of the camera-eye as separate from
the eye of the cameraman, are key here. The camera-eye is ‘completely
different ’ from the human eye, it independently captures the form of an
object, offering a surface, a partition, a space between the cameraman’s
gaze and that of the subject of the image. In the Josenkai Sex Museum
in Hokkaido in Sans Soleil, the narrator explains that there is no censorship
in the museum as any sex can be shown as long as it is ‘severed from the
body’, over stills of (humanoid) phallic and vulvic statues. The images
progress to show taxidermy animals, in copulating couples, as the voiceover
suggests that in these ‘glassy animals ’ could be read: ‘ the rift in Japanese
society, the rift between men and women. In life it seems to show itself
in two ways only. In violent slaughter or a discreet melancholy ’. The
animal, again, is a permeable partition between two supposed opposites – a
signifier for the distance, the difference, between men and women.
The shots of these animals focus doubly on the sexual organ: each image
has an iris like circle of light at its centre, illuminating the distinct,
pink, erogenous zones, highlighted in the darkened fur and shadows.
A luminous iris projects from the locus of the camera - an eye that locates
the genitals - creating an exchange between them. This double focus is
common to images created by Marker in both his film and photographic
works, such as in the photograph of Alexandra Stewart taken circa 1964
during the shooting of Pierre Kast’s The Heat of a Thousand Suns
(La Bruˆlure de mille soleils, 1965). According to Carol Mavor, Stewart
‘ looks through a porthole of glass: transparently walled off. Like Snow
White in her coffin, she is near and unreachable, in two zones at once ’
(2012, p. 59). The independent camera allows for the e´galite´ du regard, the
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lens is the permeable partition through which animal and human can
commune without restrictive boundaries.
The iris-light, the projection of the eye of the camera, does not attempt
to contain in its visuality the gaze or the sex of the animals of Josenkai. For
Levinas, the image cannot capture the face of the Other, or the genitals.
In Totality and Infinity, he writes that the face of the Other ‘destroys
and overflows the plastic image it leaves me’ (Levinas, 2012b, p. 51),
suggesting that the image cannot contain the face of the Other within its
boundaries. Hagi Kenaan develops Levinas’s concept of the face resisting
the look in his study of the gaze in Levinas’s work, writing that the face
‘ is not something that I can frame with my camera or whose location
I can point to because it is not located in any kind of “there” ’ (2013,
p. 34). For Kenaan, the face is ‘present as a kind of movement, the
crossing of a border ’ (2013, p. 34). The face cannot be confined in
the camera, the image, or the gaze, and similarly nor can the genitals. In
summarising this idea in Levinas’s work, Philippe Crignon asserts that:
The sexual organ is, at once, too much and too little for the eye. In its
exhibition, it imposes on the gaze an excess of materiality that explodes
all form, an ‘ultramateriality ’ that is ‘exorbitant ’, to use Levinas’s term.
(2004, p. 104)
The sight or site of the genitals cannot be contained because of an excess
of materiality. Ultramateriality, for Levinas, ‘designates the exhibitionist
nudity of an exorbitant presence ’ (2012b, p. 256). Ultramateriality
is profane, a paroxysm of materiality. Again, here, we encounter
a transgression of boundaries. The image or gaze is, for Levinas, also
ruptured. The face and the genitals of the Other overflow the image’s
boundaries. The images in the Josenkai museum question the boundaries
between human and animal, between sex and death. The camera-eye, in
creating the images in the museum does not attempt to ‘capture ’ the gaze
of the Other, the face, the genitals. Instead, through the e´galite´ du regard,
it establishes a communication between animal and human. The iris light
represents a link between the eye of the camera and the animals, a gaze of
sorts, making the perceiver aware of their self, as well as their awkwardness.
This communication between animal and human echoes Derrida’s
discomfort at the gaze of the cat on his nakedness that makes him question
who he is:
I often ask myself, just to see, who I am – and who I am (following) at the
moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for
example the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my
embarrassment. (2002, p. 372)
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The gaze of the animal, falling upon a vulnerable human, performs the
function of a mirror held up to the (human) self or subject. The
dissymmetry that Levinas considers essential to the obligation of
responsibility for the Other is intact, as is Marker’s notion of the cat as
deity, as the ascendant party in the interaction, the face-to-face encounter.
The images from Josenkai reverse the Derridean interaction – it is
the human who gazes at the animals’ sex – but maintain the discomfort
that stimulates the question of the self, if only because the animals
have been linked directly with humans and the rift between feminine and
masculine. These images open up a communication between human and
animal. This communication occurs, perhaps, between the animal and the
animal that resides in the human. Derrida talks of exactly this interaction,
this transcendence:
Crossing borders or the ends of man I come or surrender to the animal – to
the animal in itself, to the animal in me and the animal at unease with
itself, to the man about which Nietzsche said […] something to the
effect that it was an as yet undetermined animal, an animal lacking in itself.
(2002, p. 372)
There is a human animality that is accessed here in order to commune
with the animal and crosses the border between the two. The similarities,
not the differences, between human and animal are highlighted. The
animal face leads to the human and the human face leads to the animal.
In this way, the animal face obligates the human to it. Whether it differs
from the human face or not, it cannot be ignored.
The e´galite´ du regard, and the animal image formed from the meeting of
gazes, becomes a means of communication, of obligating the human
as subject. In his study of the animal in Bazin’s film criticism, John
Mullarkey writes that ‘what might once have been in the background
comes forward to share an intersubjective photographic space with
another ’ (2012, p. 53). The animal passes from the depth of the image into
a position of equality with the human subject. In this process, the
boundaries between human and animal are corroded, transgressed, in the
pursuit of equality between the species, an understanding that sex and
death are not exclusive to humanity is accomplished. Inspired by the
universe created by the cinematograph, Epstein writes in his major work,
The Intelligence of a Machine:
Humanity is the only measure of the universe, yet this measure measures
itself according to what it seeks to measure: it is relative among relative
measures – an absolute variable. (2014, p. 74)
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Epstein deconstructs human measurement and its understanding of the
space in which humanity exists. Marker’s camera, his camera-eye, through
the e´galite´ du regard, similarly problematises the boundaries between
animal and human. This gestures toward an egalitarian cinema, crossing
the borders between species, in which the gaze of the camera is
reciprocated by an animal face.
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